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Determinants and Market Impact of Seasoned Equity Offerings:  
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†
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper examines the decision by Australian Real Estate Trusts (A-REITs) to issue 
seasoned equity offerings from 2000 - 2008 and stock market reaction to the offerings. 
The findings reveal that highly leveraged A-REITs with variable earnings are less likely 
to issue seasoned equity offerings. Inconsistent results for structure and type of properties 
held by the A-REIT do not allow for inference to be drawn. Similar to previous studies of 
seasoned equity offerings, we find a significant negative abnormal return associated with 
their announcement and no evidence of excessive leakage of information. Furthermore, 
market reaction differences to announcements of SEOs for the pre-global financial crisis 
(GFC) (2000-2006) and GFC eras (2007-2008) are noted with GFC era shareholders 
incurring larger abnormal return losses at 1.13% in comparison to the pre-GFC era 
shareholder loss of 0.34% on the SEO announcement day. Cross-sectional regressions 
show that the issued amount, leverage and profitability are significant factors affecting 
abnormal returns. Growth opportunities, tangibility, operating risk, size of A-REIT and 
other variables capturing A-REIT structure and property types held do not have an 
impact on abnormal returns. 
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Introduction 
Many A-REITs used equity capital to fuel growth and expansion during the mid-1990’s, 
but later switched to debt financing in 1997 when the Reserve Bank of Australia cut 
interest rates in the second half of 1996, which made debt financing a cheaper option to 
equity capital (Kavanagh 1997). Chikolwa (2009) shows the dominance by A-REITs of 
using public debt to funding operations and expansion through commercial mortgage-
backed securities and unsecured bonds over equity raisings for the period 2000 - 2008. 
With the shutting down of the Australian public debt markets in Q3:2007, A-REIT equity 
raisings came back in vogue with a total of AU$14.4 billion raised in 2007 - 2008. PIR 
(2008) state that a total AU$50.9 billion was raised through equity raisings between 2000 
– 2008. The current issuances counter established theory that firms time their equity 
issue to coincide with high equity prices (Baker et al. 2003), firms that issue SEOs 
exhibit strong abnormal performance during the period preceding issue (Schultz 2003, 
2004) and that shareholders and management will attempt to take advantage of ‘window 
of opportunity’ in choosing when to issue equity (Loughran & Ritter 1995; Ritter 1991)1. 
 
Newell (2008) showed the prominence of the A-REIT market second to the US and two 
A-REITs (Westfield and Stockland) being part of the top 10 largest REITs as at 
December 2007 and yet no study has empirically investigated A-REIT equity raisings. 
Prior non-Australian REIT research documents that investors react negatively, on 
average, to announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) (Brounen & Eichholtz 
2002; Ghosh et al. 1999; Marciukaityte et al. 2007), although competing explanations 
                                                 
1
 Quarterly total returns of the S&P/ASX A-REIT 300 and the ASX All Ordinaries Indices fell by -33.2% 
and by 20.2%, respectively, to December 2008. With the Australia public debt market closed, asset sales 
and SEOs were the main capital raising options available for A-REITs. 
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remain for these empirical results and little evidence exits of the determinants of REIT’s 
choice to issue SEOs. 
 
As such, the purpose of this paper is to analyse two areas of A-REIT SEOs, namely, 
determinants of the decision by an A-REIT to issue SEO and market reaction to SEOs 
before and during the global financial crisis (GFC) to December 2008. Despite a worth 
of literature on market reaction to SEOs, there is limited evidence on the motivation 
behind SEO issuance. A recent study by Woojin and Weisbach (2008) investigates this 
issue on the basis of capital raising and market timing and concludes that SEOs are used 
both to finance investment and to exploit a firm’s valuation when it is valued very highly 
by the market. 
 
Apart from data being based on Australia, the study differs from previous international 
studies as it includes other firm-specific attributes such as property sector, stapled 
management structure
2
 and international operations in addition to the traditional 
determinants of capital structure such as asset size, profitability ratios, tangibility of 
assets, growth opportunities, and operating risk. The analysis is conducted using data 
pertaining to 34 A-REITs in the S&P/ASX 300 Index for the period 2000 - 2008.  
 
Our results show that that leverage, growth opportunities and operating risk are the main 
determinants of the decision by A-REITs to issue SEO. Of the property-specific factors, 
only stapled management structure and international operations are significant 
determinants, with type of property held by an A-REIT show inconsistent results. Similar 
                                                 
2
 Stapled management structure involves funds management and property  development, in addition to the 
traditional passive property holding for investment. 
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to previous REIT studies of SEO, we find a significant negative abnormal return 
associated with their announcement and no evidence of excessive leakage of information. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on SEO. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology. The study results and their analyses are shown in 
Section 4. Concluding are shown in Section 5.  
Literature Review 
Several competing explanations have been postulated on why investors react negatively, 
on average, to SEO announcements. Although, no single hypothesis fully explains 
market reaction to SEOs, they all contribute to the body of knowledge on SEOs. 
 
One explanation to investors’ negative reaction to SEOs is the price pressure hypothesis. 
The essential argument of the hypothesis is that the negative market reaction to equity 
issues occurs because there are no very close substitutes for the equity of the issuing 
company, and so the price has to fall sharply for the market to absorb the increased 
quantity supplied (Scholes 1972). However, Loderer et al. (1991) found no evidence to 
suggest that the negative abnormal returns were due to the determinants of price 
elasticity. 
 
Under the information asymmetry effect hypothesis, negative stock price reactions to the 
announcements and attributes this phenomenon to the information asymmetry between 
corporate managers and outside investors (Myers & Majluf 1984).  Corporate managers 
have superior information about investment projects, with outside investors believing 
that managers act in the interest of existing shareholders and therefore prefer to issue 
equity when they perceive that it is overvalued. Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that the 
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information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is not fixed over time and firms 
will prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed. 
 
Miller and Rock’s (1985) investment opportunity hypothesis theorises that firms are 
faced with constant investment requirements and thus security issues signal a projected 
shortfall in the earnings of the issuing company. Chang and Chen (2007) find that 
announcing firms with favourable investment opportunities have a positive response to 
the announcements of their secured debt offerings, in contrast to Eckbo (1986) who 
found that share prices did not change significantly when debt issues were announced to 
the market.  
 
Barclay and Litzenberger’s (1988) wasteful investment hypothesis postulates that market 
reaction to all disclosures of new security issues will be positively related to indications 
of corporate growth prospects. This builds on earlier insights by Jensen's (1986) analysis 
that the market reaction to new financing announcements will reflect investors' 
awareness that managers have an incentive to overinvest newly raised funds by spending 
the cash on projects with negative net present values (NPVs) as long as their rewards are 
closely linked to the size of the firm rather than to shareholders' wealth. The theory 
therefore predicts that the market reaction to equity issues will be adverse as long as 
investors are sceptical of managers' motives. 
 
Under the wealth effects hypothesis, unexpected issue of new equity reduces the risk of 
the firms’ outstanding debt and consequently results in a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to bondholders. Therefore, the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio decrease results in 
negative abnormal returns (Masulis 1983). However, Elliot et al (2009) find that 
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bondholders experience a significant positive return on the announcement of an SEO and 
this effect is more pronounced for bonds with lower ratings. 
 
Previous attempts to identify the factors which explain any cross-sectional variation in 
the market reaction to seasoned equity offers (SEOs) have provided relatively mixed 
results. For example, several studies have examined the relationship between the size of 
an equity issue and the market reaction to the announcement; they find that the 
association is either (i) negative and insignificant (Aggarwal & Zhao 2008; Lin et al. 
2008), negative and significant (Ghosh et al. 1999; Masulis & Korwar 1986), positive 
and insignificant (Sant & Ferris 1994), Other variables which have been examined as 
potential determinants of the market reaction to SEOs include (a) pre-issue information 
(Lin et al. 2008), (b) debt levels (Walker & Yost 2008), (c) issue purposes (Autore et al. 
2009), (d) growth opportunities (Burton et al. 2000; Chou et al. 2009), (e) institutional 
holding (Ghosh et al. 1999), (f) operating performance of issuer (Andrikopoulos 2009); 
investigations into the role played by each of these factors also show mixed results. 
 
Lin et al (2008) find none of the pre-issue disclosures by managers to reduce the costs of 
SEOs are capable of reducing the price drop at issue announcement and that both price 
and trading volume reactions are not related to the intervals between the disclosures and 
the issue announcements. 
 
Autore et al. (2009) find that issuers stating recapitalization or general corporate 
purposes experience abnormally poor performance in the subsequent three years, but 
issuers stating investment display little or no subsequent underperformance. 
Recapitalisation includes issuing equity to pay down debt obligations. If debt is 
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excessive, recapitalizing by issuing equity to pay down debt might reduce shareholder 
value. To avoid this, management could recapitalize debt by issuing stock when investors 
are overly optimistic about the firm's future prospects, potentially resulting in relative 
devaluation over the long-run. For example, Hertzel and Li (2007) find that issuing firms 
that are overvalued tend to reduce debt after the issue. A different insight is offered by 
Walker and Yost (2008), who find that firms with a stated intention of paying down debt 
actually have leverage ratios three years after the SEO that are similar to leverage ratios 
prior to the SEO. Thus, firms issuing equity to refinance may be opportunistic market 
timers and, therefore, we expect these firms to experience poor long-run performance. 
 
Autore et al. (2009) and Hertzel and Li (2007), find that issuers with higher growth 
options invest more after the SEO and do not experience poor post-issue stock returns, 
but issuers with greater overvaluation decrease long-term debt and increase cash after the 
issue and suffer poor long-run stock performance. This finding differs, however, from 
the result of Walker and Yost (2008) that issuers intending to decrease debt have 
subsequent improvements in industry-adjusted operating performance. Another contrary 
view of the negative relation between the level of growth opportunities and post-offering 
long-term stock performance for firms issuing equity privately is offered by Chou et al. 
(2009) who attribute this to three explanations: real investment hypothesis (Li et al. 
2009), skewness preference (Barberis & Huang 2008), and conditional over-optimism.  
 
Andrikopoulos (2009) state that the long-term underperformance is significantly related 
to a deterioration of companies’ operating fundamentals in the post-offering period. 
Allen and Soucik (2008) report underperformance of Australian firms issuing seasoned 
equity during the first 5 years following the offer and significant overinvestment in the 
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sixth year. They attribute the underperformance to the initial underpricing, as reflected in 
the dilution yield measure of initial returns. 
 
Ghosh et al. (1999) found the structure and type of properties held by the REIT to be 
insignificant, with no allowable inference to be drawn. Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) 
also come to the same conclusion for type of property held by European property 
companies. 
Data and Methodology 
Data and Sample Selection 
This study examines the event of SEOs by 34 A-REITs in the S&P/ASX 300 Index 
during 2000 – 2008. The financial data and trading data for A-REITs were collected 
from Aspect Fin Analysis and Connect 4 databases, respectively. Returns for the ASX 
Ordinaries Index were obtained from DataStream database. From 2000 – 2008, 277 
SEOs were issued totalling AU$26 billion, of which 81 were above AU$10 million; see 
Table 1. A minimum SEO issue size of AU$10 million was selected on the basis that 
most A-REITs invest in properties above this amount and such an amount will have an 
impact on their operational capacity. The final sample reduces to 64 after combining all 
issues in a particular year. 
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Table 1: A-REIT Seasoned Equity Offerings 2000 - 2008 
Year No. of Issues AU$ Billion Percentage
2000 16 $1.29 5.0%
2001 43 $2.06 8.0%
2002 40 $3.84 14.9%
2003 32 $3.49 13.5%
2004 33 $2.07 8.0%
2005 28 $2.98 11.5%
2006 28 $2.09 8.1%
2007 31 $3.83 14.8%
2008 26 $4.16 16.1%
Total 277 $25.81 100.0%  
Source: Authors’ compilation from Connect 4 Database 
 
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows how the composition of these issues were dominated by 
private placements in the earlier years and in the recent past by priority issues. Private 
placements totalled AU$16.8 billion and priority issues AU$7.9 billion, respectively, 
over the study period. 
 
Table 1: Composition of A-REIT Seasoned Equity Offerings 2000 - 2008 
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Source: Authors’ compilation from Connect 4 Database 
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The sample is divided into two to investigate differences in issuance drivers and market 
reaction, if any, during the A-REIT growth period of 2000 – 2006 and the GFC period 
2007 – 2008. De Francisco et al. (2009) put the period from the 1990s until mid-2007 has 
the ‘golden era’ of the A-REIT sector during which time the sector experienced average 
growth of 22% per annum and reaching a peak market capitalisation of AU$127 billion 
in May 2007.  From then on the A-REIT sector has underperformed the ASX share 
market, with quarterly total returns of the S&P/ASX A-REIT 300 and the ASX All 
Ordinaries indices falling by -33.2% and by 20.2%, respectively, to December 2008. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics regarding the sample of large SEO issues above AU$10 million are 
provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
ERD 7.913 9.277 4.768 0.721
LTA 0.417 1.003 0.000 0.185
ROA 0.026 0.220 -7.652 0.511
TOQ 1.001 2.028 0.000 0.353
PPT 0.556 0.999 0.000 0.372
SDE 0.124 2.590 0.000 0.471
SIZ 8.933 10.706 0.000 1.590
SRE 0.197 1.000 0.000 0.398
SOF 0.135 1.000 0.000 0.343
SDD 0.074 1.000 0.000 0.263
SOT 0.279 1.000 0.000 0.450
SSS 0.541 1.000 0.000 0.499
INT 0.616 1.000 0.000 0.487
Notes: The summary statistics are based on a sample of 229 firm-year observations. The regressors are 
natural log of AU$ million of seasoned equity raised (ERD);  leverage: the ratio of total liability to total 
assets (LTA); profitability: return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: 
ratio of book value of property to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled 
by total assets for each firm over the entire period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZ); and property sector dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial 
(SDD); others (SOT); stapled structure management dummy varaible of 1 or 0 otherwise (SSS); and 
international operations dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT).  
 
The reliability of the research as a whole is checked through estimation of the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients between any two regressors. Table 3 shows that correlation 
among the regressors is low with 12 out of 59 correlation coefficients higher than 0.2 but 
all under 0.5 in absolute value. According to these results the multicollinearity problem 
seems to be avoided. 
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Table 3:  Correlation Coefficients 
LTA ROA TOQ PPT SDE SIZ SRE SOF SDD SOT SSS
ROA -0.113
TOQ 0.244 -0.101
PPT -0.328 0.104 -0.124
SDE 0.112 -0.355 0.355 -0.194
SIZ 0.311 0.141 0.351 0.297 -0.118
SRE -0.050 0.032 -0.204 0.164 -0.096 0.017
SOF -0.164 0.027 -0.013 0.297 -0.086 0.085 -0.196
SDD -0.071 0.018 -0.084 0.147 -0.060 0.084 -0.140 -0.112
SOT 0.337 0.046 0.128 -0.410 -0.111 -0.139 -0.308 -0.246 -0.176
SSS 0.084 -0.059 0.148 -0.305 0.175 0.020 -0.185 -0.225 -0.141 -0.052
INT -0.010 0.081 -0.179 0.034 -0.229 0.126 0.187 0.076 0.224 -0.348 0.084
Notes: The summary statistics are based on a sample of 229 firm-year observations. The dependent 
variables for the models are binary taking the value of 1 if an A-REIT raised seasoned equity, 0 
othersiwise.  The regressors are leverage: the ratio of total liability to total assets (LTA); profitability: 
return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: ratio of book value of 
property to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets for each 
firm over the entire period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZ); and property sector 
dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial (SDD); others (SOT); stapled 
structure management dummy varaible of 1 or 0 otherwise (SSS); and international operations dummy 
variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT).  
Measurement and Interpretation of Variables 
 
Following previous studies that have investigated the impact of leverage (Walker & Yost 
2008), profitability (Andrikopoulos 2009), tangibility (Lyandres et al. 2008), size (Guo 
& Mech 2000), growth opportunities (Chou et al. 2009) and operating risk (Guo & Mech 
2000) on the announcement effect of SEOs, additional variables of property sector, 
stapled management structure, and international operations are included in this study to 
fully capture the structure and type of properties held by the A-REIT similar to Ghosh et 
al. (1999). 
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Guo and Mech (2000) document evidence that larger firm, the higher the probability of 
SEOs. They also suggest that security risk is a more direct measure of valuation of 
uncertainty, which implies that firms with higher risk are less likely to issue equity. In 
addition, they show that firms with more cash on hand and expected internal cash flow 
are less likely to issue equity. Burton et al. (2000) and Chou et al. (2009) report the effect 
of equity issue announcements is influenced by the value of the growth opportunities of 
the issuing firm. Lyandres at al. (2008) employ the ratio of investment in real assets to 
total assets as a measure of investment. We proxy size by the natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZ) and use return on assets (ROA) to measure profitability. We use an 
approximation of Tobin’s q (TOQ) to proxy for growth opportunities. The Tobin’s q 
ratio is defined as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to 
the book value of assets. The proxy for tangibility is the ratio of the book value of 
property to total assets (PPT). Standard deviation of earnings before income tax (EBIT) 
scaled by total assets (SDE) for each firm over the entire period covered is used as a 
proxy for operating risk. 
Probit Model  
Accordingly, the probit model we employ to estimate the probability of a SEO is as 
follows: 
 
Prob (SEOit = 1) = α0 + αLTAi +  αROAi +  αTOQi +  αPPTi + αSDEi + αSIZi + 
αDUMp,i + αDUMs,i  + αDUMI,i + ζi   (1) 
 
where: SEO =  dummy variable that equals 1 if an A-REIT i issued a SEO in year t, 
otherwise 0; 
LTA = ratio of total liability to total assets; 
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ROA = return on assets; 
TOQ = ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the 
book value of assets; 
PPT = ratio of the book value of property to total assets; 
SDE = standard deviation of earnings before income tax (EBIT) scaled by 
total assets; 
SIZ = natural logarithm of total assets; 
DUMP = dummy variable for property sector; 
DUMS = dummy variable for stapled management structure; and 
DUMI = dummy variable for international operations. 
Event Study Methodology 
 
To analyse the price effect of the SEOs, the standard market model approach was 
employed as outline in Brown and Warner (1985). Specifically, each sample observation 
was regressed against a market index, the ASX All Ordinaries Index Rmt,, using an 
ordinary least square as follows: 
 
       (2) 
 
where: Rit  = continuous return on the shares of firm i during period t; 
 Rmt = continuous return on the market index during period t;  
 αi  = intercept for firm i; and 
 βi  = slope coefficient (market beta) for firm i. 
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An estimation window of (-115, -16) was used for the above regression. The window 
was deemed appropriate considering that prior studies tended to use a similar size 
estimation window, and that 100 trading days strike a balance between accurately 
gauging a company’s relationship to the market and incorporating too many firm specific 
trends that could bias the regression.  
 
The alpha and beta of the market model were used to calculate the predicted returns of 
each observation over a range of event window, [-15,+15]. The Abnormal Return (ARit) 
for each event day was then calculated as the difference between the observed return and 
predicted return.  
 
       (3) 
 
To test whether the average abnormal return was statistically different from zero, we 
follow the technique proposed by Dodd and Warner (1983) where individual abnormal 
returns are standardised (by their standard deviations) and then aggregated to obtain a Z-
statistics as follows:  
 
  ,      (4) 
where: 
  , and    (5) 
 
        (6) 
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The advantage of this standardising procedure is that it permits the entire cross-sectional 
distribution of abnormal returns to be compared to a unit normal and reduces the effects of 
outliers (Dodd & Warner 1983).  
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for A-REITi, denoted CARi are formed by summing ARit over 
various lengths of time. Average ARs and CARs are calculated and treated to see if they are 
different from zero. 
Ordinary Least Square Methodology 
A model is developed and estimated for cross-sectional market reaction to SEOs using an 
ordinary least square regression based on theoretical explanations in literature. The model 
includes variables for issue amount (ERD), leverage (LTA), profitability (ROA), tangibility 
(PPT), operating risk (SDE), size (SIZ), and dummy variables to capture structure and 
property types held by an A-REIT. The following multivariate regression equation was used: 
 
 CARit = α0 + β1ERDi + β2LTAi + β3ROAi + β4TOQi + β5PPTi + β6SDEi + 
β7SIZi + β8DUMp,i + β9DUMs,i + β10DUMI,i +εit  (7) 
  
where: CARit = standardized cumulative abnormal return day 0 to day 1;  
ERDi  = natural logarithm of issued amount; 
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Results and Analysis 
Determinants of SEO Issuance Choice 
 
Two separate, single equation models were estimated by probit model for the entire study 
period of 2000 - 2008. The results are given in Table 4. The models explain between 
17% and 25 % of the within-sample variance in the dependent variables and the LR 
statistics show that the models are, overall, significant. 
 
Table 4:  Probit Regression Results of SEO Issuance Choice 
Variable
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
C -0.350 -0.700 -0.367 -0.623
LTA -1.185 (-1.718 *** -1.054 (-1.620 ***
ROA 4.107 1.334 5.863 1.821 ***
TOQ 0.441 1.416 0.722 2.165 **
PPT 0.790 2.521 ** 0.297 0.829
SDE -9.491 (-2.667 * -14.464 (-3.411 *
SIZ -0.037 -0.494 -0.051 -0.649
SRE 1.929
SOF 1.166
SDD -0.097
SOT -0.917
SSS (-2.550 **
INT 1.977 **
McFadden R-squared 0.165 0.253
LR statistic 50.024 76.638
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000 0.000
Notes: The dependent variables for the models are binary taking the value of 1 if an A-REIT issued 
seasoned equity, 0 otherswise. The regressors are leverage: the ratio of total liability to total assets 
(LTA); profitability: return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: ratio of 
book value of property to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total 
assets for each firm over the entire period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZ); 
and property sector dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial (SDD); 
others (SOT); stapled structure management dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (SSS); and international 
operations dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT).  *Significant at 1% level; ** significant at the 5% 
level; and ***significant at the 10% level.
Model 1 Model 2
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In order to maintain brevity and to capture the A-REIT setting, only results of model 2 
are discussed. Leverage (LTA) and operating risk (SDE) show a negative significant 
relationship at 10% level and 5% level, respectively, to the decision to issue SEOs by A-
REITs. This result supports that of Guo and Mech (2000) that highly leveraged firms 
with variable earnings are less likely to issue SEOs. Profitability (ROA) and growth 
opportunities (TOQ) are positive and significant at 5% level. The result for profitability 
is anomalous as profitable firms are less likely to issue SEOs. Tangibility and size are 
insignificant. Variables for structure and type of properties held by the A-REIT are 
inconsistent and mainly insignificant; only the retail A-REIT, stapled management 
structure and international operations variables are significant at 5% level. These results 
are consistent with Brown and Riddiough (2003) who found property type held by REITs 
to be insignificant in the choice to issue either debt or equity. 
Event Study Results 
 
Table 5 presents daily average standardised abnormal returns (ASAR) and average 
standardised cumulative abnormal returns (ASCAR) for A-REIT SEO issuance during 
the event window. The day zero average abnormal return is -0.56% with statistical 
significance at 1% level. The largest abnormal return in the event window occurs on day 
1 at -0.95% which can imply that the market fully reacts to SEO issuance a day after the 
announcement. After the announcement date, the other days that are statistically 
significant are days 3 and 4 at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. There is no strong 
evidence of leakage of information on SEO issuance as only days -12 and -4 are 
statistically significant at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The ASAR for the window (-
1,+1) is -1.39% which is comparable in magnitude with similar studies in US by Ghosh 
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et al. (1999) who had -1.56% and in Europe by Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) who had -
1.21%. 
Table 5: Stock Price Effects Surrounding the Announcement of A-REIT Seasoned 
Equity Issues 2000-2008 
Event Day ASAR z-stat ASCAR z-stat
-15 -0.134 -1.073 -0.134 -1.064
-14 -0.036 -0.283 -0.170 -0.951
-13 0.078 0.623 -0.092 -0.420
-12 -0.282 -2.248 ** -0.374 -1.479
-11 0.000 -0.004 -0.374 -1.325
-10 0.066 0.525 -0.308 -0.996
-9 -0.158 -1.259 -0.466 -1.395
-8 -0.063 -0.499 -0.529 -1.480
-7 -0.134 -1.068 -0.662 -1.748 ***
-6 -0.050 -0.400 -0.712 -1.784 ***
-5 -0.180 -1.437 -0.893 -2.131
-4 0.241 1.926 *** -0.651 -1.489
-3 -0.169 -1.347 -0.820 -1.801 ***
-2 0.081 0.644 -0.739 -1.565
-1 0.125 0.995 -0.615 -1.257
0 -0.564 -4.502 * -1.179 -2.333 **
1 -0.955 -7.620 * -2.134 -4.097 *
2 -0.203 -1.620 *** -2.337 -4.361 *
3 -0.268 -2.138 ** -2.604 -4.731 *
4 -0.036 -0.287 -2.640 -4.675 *
5 -0.021 -0.164 -2.661 -4.598 *
6 0.307 2.453 -2.354 -3.973 *
7 -0.003 -0.027 -2.357 -3.892 *
8 -0.152 -1.211 -2.509 -4.055 *
9 -0.031 -0.244 -2.539 -4.021 *
10 -0.080 -0.637 -2.619 -4.067 *
11 0.006 0.051 -2.613 -3.981 *
12 -0.184 -1.470 -2.797 -4.185 *
13 0.020 0.161 -2.777 -4.083 *
14 -0.087 -0.693 -2.864 -4.140 *
15 -0.092 -0.733 -2.955 -4.203 *
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding seasoned equity announcements of over 
AU$10 million by A-REITs in the S&P ASX300 Index over the entire study period of 2000 - 2008. The 
event day (Day 0) is defined as the actual date of announcement by the A-REIT. ASAR is the average 
standardised abnormal return of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event 
day. ASCAR is the average standardised cumulative abnormal return between day -15 and the relevant 
event day.  
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Overall, the ASCAR around the SEO announcement day have negative values and trend 
in a downward direction. On the announcement day, the ASCAR is a loss of 1.18% to 
shareholders. This loss continues to reach -2.96% on day 15 as the days have significant 
results at 1% level.  ASCAR results further confirm those of ASAR of minimal evidence 
of announcement leakage; only days -7, -6 and -3 have significant results at 10%. 
 
We further divide our sample into two periods to investigate market reaction differences, 
if any, to A-REIT SEO issuance for the pre-GFC and GFC periods, i.e. 2000 - 2006 and 
2007 – 2008, respectively. Market reaction results for the two periods are shown in Table 
6. 
 
Shareholders experienced a larger loss on the SEO announcement day at -1.13% during 
the GFC era in comparison to the pre-GFC era loss of 0.34%. Results show evidence of 
information leakage of SEO issuance three days before the announcement as days -3 to -
1 indicate significant negative abnormal returns at either 1% or 5% levels. This is 
confirmed as only day 10 has a significant abnormal return at 10% level. In addition, the 
ASCAR is lesser at -2.55% in comparison to the pre-GFC era value of -3.13% on day 15. 
 
For the pre-GFC era, the market fully negatively reacted a day after the SEO 
announcement at 1.07% and continued in a downward trend to record a cumulative loss 
of 3.73% on day 15 at 1% level of significance. Furthermore, ASCAR support evidence 
of information leakage as only four days had insignificant negative abnormal returns, 
with the rest of the days significant at either 5% or 10% levels. 
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Table 6: Stock Price Effects Surrounding the Announcement of A-REIT Seasoned 
Equity Issues in Pre-GFC and GFC Eras 
Event Day ASAR z-stat ASCAR z-stat ASAR z-stat ASCAR z-stat
-15 -0.136 -0.915 -0.136 -0.905 -0.035 -0.148 -0.035 -1.064
-14 -0.186 -1.249 -0.322 -1.513 0.355 1.492 0.320 -0.951
-13 -0.024 -0.164 -0.347 -1.329 0.281 1.180 0.601 -0.420
-12 -0.316 -2.121 -0.663 -2.199 ** -0.189 -0.793 0.412 -1.479
-11 -0.033 -0.225 -0.696 -2.067 ** 0.116 0.488 0.529 -1.325
-10 0.151 1.015 -0.545 -1.477 -0.126 -0.527 0.403 -0.996
-9 -0.189 -1.267 -0.734 -1.841 *** -0.101 -0.426 0.302 -1.395
-8 0.010 0.065 -0.724 -1.699 *** -0.233 -0.977 0.069 -1.480
-7 -0.087 -0.583 -0.811 -1.794 *** -0.221 -0.930 -0.152 -1.748
-6 -0.206 -1.386 -1.017 -2.136 ** 0.368 1.544 0.215 -1.784
-5 -0.117 -0.784 -1.134 -2.270 ** -0.198 -0.831 0.017 -2.131
-4 0.157 1.057 -0.977 -1.872 *** 0.293 1.232 0.311 -1.489
-3 0.024 0.162 -0.952 -1.754 *** -0.660 -2.770 * -0.349 -1.801
-2 -0.112 -0.749 -1.064 -1.888 *** 0.563 2.365 ** 0.214 -1.565
-1 -0.038 -0.257 -1.102 -1.890 *** 0.512 2.151 ** 0.727 -1.257
0 -0.344 -2.310 ** -1.446 -2.401 ** -1.129 -4.740 * -0.402 -2.333
1 -1.068 -7.171 * -2.514 -4.049 * -0.758 -3.185 * -1.161 -4.097
2 -0.138 -0.926 -2.652 -4.150 * -0.269 -1.129 -1.430 -4.361
3 -0.341 -2.288 ** -2.993 -4.559 * -0.163 -0.684 -1.593 -4.731
4 -0.110 -0.739 -3.103 -4.607 * 0.150 0.628 -1.443 -4.675
5 0.027 0.184 -3.076 -4.456 * -0.120 -0.504 -1.563 -4.598
6 0.314 2.111 ** -2.761 -3.909 * 0.352 1.480 -1.211 -3.973
7 -0.063 -0.424 -2.824 -3.910 * 0.010 0.040 -1.201 -3.892
8 -0.079 -0.531 -2.904 -3.935 * -0.333 -1.399 -1.534 -4.055
9 -0.090 -0.607 -2.994 -3.976 * 0.188 0.788 -1.346 -4.021
10 0.037 0.246 -2.957 -3.851 * -0.450 -1.891 *** -1.797 -4.067
11 0.134 0.900 -2.823 -3.608 * -0.332 -1.394 -2.129 -3.981 **
12 -0.291 -1.955 ** -3.115 -3.908 * 0.098 0.413 -2.030 -4.185 **
13 0.049 0.326 -3.066 -3.780 * -0.069 -0.291 -2.099 -4.083 **
14 -0.041 -0.276 -3.107 -3.766 * -0.170 -0.714 -2.269 -4.140 **
15 -0.019 -0.131 -3.127 -3.728 * -0.282 -1.183 -2.551 -4.203 **
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding seasoned equity announcements of over 
AU$10 million by A-REITs in the S&P/ASX300 Index over the sub-sample periods of 2000-2006 and 
2007-2008, respectively. The event day (Day 0) is defined as the actual date of announcement by the A-
REIT. ASAR is the average standardised abnormal return of the cross-sectionally combined 
observations for the relevant event day. ASCAR is the average standardised cumulative  abnormal 
return between day -15 and the relevant event day.
Period A: 2000-2006 Period B: 2007-2008
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Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
 
In Table 7, results of the examination of cross-section explanations of the market 
reaction to the announcement effect are presented. These represent the entire study 
period as not enough data points were variable for the GFC period, 2007 - 2008, to offer 
meaningful results. The dependent variable in each of the models is the two-day 
ASCAR, as described earlier. The base model (model 1) includes control variables for 
the firm's leverage, profitability, growth opportunities, tangibility, operating risk and 
size. Model 2 includes variables to capture structure and property type held by an A-
REIT, in addition to the base model variables. The R-squared (0.38) for full model 
confirms good explanatory power. 
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Table 7: Regression Analysis of ASCAR 
Variable
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
C -0.020 -0.579 -0.065 -1.146
ERD 0.006 5.248 * 0.007 4.526 *
LTA 0.022 2.028 ** 0.024 1.789 ***
ROA -0.070 -1.581 -0.124 (-1.793 ***
TOQ -0.011 (-1.644 *** -0.005 -0.346
PPT -0.003 -0.699 -0.002 -0.315
SDE 0.025 0.747 0.046 0.914
SIZ -0.002 -0.960 0.001 0.247
SRE 0.002 0.446
SOF 0.000 -0.048
SDD 0.004 0.411
SOT 0.007 1.363
SSS 0.004 1.085
INT 0.002 0.406
R-squared 0.370 0.381
Model 1 Model 2
Notes: The dependent variable is the average standardised cumulative abnormal return for day 0 and +1. 
The regressors are natural log of the issued ammount (ERD); leverage: the ratio of total liability to total 
assets (LTA); profitability: return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities: Tobin's Q (TOQ); tangibility: 
ratio of book value of property to total assets (PPT); operating risk: standard deviation of EBIT scaled by 
total assets for each firm over the entire period covered (SDE); size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZ); 
and property sector dummy variables of 1 or 0 otherwise: retail (SRE), office (SOF), industrial (SDD); 
others (SOT); stapled structure management dummy varaible of 1 or 0 otherwise (SSS); and international 
operations dummy variable of 1 or 0 otherwise (INT).  *Significant at 1% level; ** significant at the 5% 
level; and ***significant at the 10% level.  
 
To maintain brevity, results of Model 2 which fully reflects A-REIT market structure and 
type of properties held are discussed. Issue amount (ERD) and leverage (LTA) are 
positive and significant at 1% and 10% levels, respectively. The significant positive 
relationship between relative size (ERD) and the announcement returns is inconsistent 
with the general and signalling asymmetry models of Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Miller and Rock (1985) and the empirical evidence for SEOs. However, the result is 
consistent with Owen and Suchard (2008) for rights issues in Australia. Leverage has an 
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anomalous positive sign as the wealth transfer hypothesis states that highly leveraged 
firms should have a negative impact of announcement returns. This result may not be 
surprising as literature has been inconclusive on the relation between leverage and 
issuance announcement returns (Aggarwal & Zhao 2008; Masulis & Korwar 1986)  
 
Profitability (ROA) is negative and significant at 10% and has largest explanatory power 
of the coefficients at -0.124. This supports the view that high cash flow reflects greater 
internal resources and less need for external capital suggesting that the need for new 
capital could be interpreted as bad news. The remaining variables for growth prospects 
(TOQ), tangibility (PPT), operational risk (SDE) and size (SIZ) are statistically 
insignificant despite showing anticipated signs. Lin et al. (2008) find variables capturing 
firm size, growth opportunities and firm risk, among others, to have insignificant 
influence on price reaction. Similar to Ghosh et al. (1999) we find structure and type of 
properties held by the A-REIT to be insignificant, which does not allow for inference to 
be drawn. This is further reinforced by the marginal increase in R-squared from 0.37 for 
the base model 1 to 0.38 for the full model 2, showing that the unique A-REIT features 
have little explanatory power on market reaction to the announcement effect. 
Conclusion 
The paper examines the decision by Australian Real Estate Trusts (A-REITs) to issue 
seasoned equity offerings from 2000 - 2008 and stock market reaction to the offerings. 
The findings review that leverage and operating risk are negative significant 
determinants of the decision to issue seasoned equity offerings (SEO); profitability and 
growth opportunities are positive significant determinants. Of the structure and type of 
properties held by the A-REIT, only stapled management structure and international 
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operations are significant determinants. Types of property held by A-REITs show 
inconsistent results that does not allow for inference to be drawn. 
 
Similar to previous studies of SEO, we find a significant negative abnormal return 
associated with their announcement and no evidence of excessive leakage of information. 
Furthermore, we investigate for market reaction differences to announcements of SEOs 
for the pre-global financial crisis (GFC) (2000-2006) and GFC eras (2007-2008). In the 
GFC era, shareholders had a larger loss in abnormal return at 1.13% in comparison to the 
pre-GFC era lost of 0.34% on the SEO announcement day. In addition, evidence is 
shown that information leakage occurred three days before the SEO announcement date 
in the GFC era. On the contrary, the market in the pre-GFC era fully reflected the SEO 
announcement after a day of the announcement and continued to show significant 
negative abnormal returns until day 15.  
 
Cross-sectional regressions show that the issued amount, leverage and profitability are 
significant factors affecting abnormal returns. Growth opportunities, tangibility, 
operating risk, size of A-REIT and other variables capturing A-REIT structure and 
property types held do not have an impact on abnormal returns. 
 
These findings add to literature as no study has examined SEOs by A-REITs, despite 
Australia being the second largest global REIT market. Though outside the scope of this 
paper, the roles played by underwriters and institutional investors in A-REIT SEOs 
would be another interesting area of future research. 
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